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Employee, ) 
v. ) State File No.: 24706-2015 
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EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER 
THIS CAUSE carne before the undersigned Workers' Compensation Judge on 
June 18, 2015, upon the Request for Expedited Hearing filed by Sarah Kaye Mcintosh 
(Ms. Mcintosh), the Employee, on June 4, 2015, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-239 to determine if Randstad, the Employer, is obligated to provide medical 
and/or temporary disability benefits, as well as discovery. The parties resolved the 
request for discovery informally before the Expedited Hearing. 
The undersigned Workers' Compensation Judge conducted an in person Expedited 
Hearing on June 18, 2015. Considering the positions of the parties, the applicable law, 
and all of the evidence submitted, the Court concludes that Ms. Mcintosh would likely 
prevail at a hearing on the merits and is entitled to further medical and temporary 
disability benefits. 
ANALYSIS 
Issue 
Whether Ms. Mcintosh has demonstrated that she would likely prevail at a hearing 
on the merits so as to entitle her to further medical or temporary disability benefits. 
I 
Evidence Submitted 
The Court admitted into evidence the exhibits below: 
1. Medical Records of Baptist Minor Medical Center 
2. Panel of Physicians (Form C-42) 
3. Wage Statement 
4. Summary (by insurance adjuster) of Ms. Mcintosh's statement 
5. Workers' Compensation Claim Questionnaire 
6. Transcribed statement of Ms. Mcintosh 
7. Notice of Denial Letter (from ESIS, dated April 9, 2015) 
8. Text message from Ms. Mcintosh to Rands tad, notice of injury 
9. Emails between Ms. Mcintosh and Layanna Willis (Randstad manager) 
10. Email from Layanna Willis at Randstad to Ms. Mcintosh that work 
assignment ended 
11. Affidavit of Ms. Mcintosh. 
The Court designated the following as the technical record: 
• Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD), filed April 16, 2015 
• Dispute Certification Notice (DCN), filed May 28, 2015 
• Request for Expedited Hearing, filed Jun 4, 2015. 
The Court did not consider attachments to the above filings unless admitted into 
evidence during the Expedited Hearing. The Court considered factual statements in the 
above filings or any attachments thereto as allegations unless established by the evidence. 
Ms. Mcintosh provided in-person testimony. 
History of Claim 
Randstad is a staffing agency that employed Ms. Mcintosh on February 6, 2013, as 
an insurance specialist at Accredo, a pharmacy management company. Beginning March 
23, 2015, work was slow and Accredo assigned Ms. Mcintosh and two other workers a 
project of organizing a large number of old insurance files. Between March 23, 2015, and 
March 30, 2015, Ms. Mcintosh worked an eight-hour work day re-filing thousands of 
pieces of paper into new files. After a few days, her hands became painful and numb. 
She attempted to self-treat and on March 27, 2015, went to Walgreens and purchased two 
wrist braces. Her condition did not improve and on March 30, 2015, she gave email 
notice of her work injury to Layanna Willis, her manager at Randstad. 
Randstad provided a panel of physicians, and on March 31, 2015, Ms. Mcintosh 
selected Baptist Minor Medical Center (BMMC) as her authorized physician. Ms. 
Mcintosh treated on one occasion at BMMC on April 1, 2015. She reported a history that 
"we had special project of filing thousands of files, my hands became sore, then numb 
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and very painful." Her diagnosis was "acute carpal tunnel syndrome both hands/wrist[s]." 
BMMC referred Ms. Mcintosh to an "orthopedic doctor" for further treatment. BMMC 
assigned "transitional duty" work restrictions with limited use of both hands, including 
limitations on repetitive movement, pushing/pulling, reaching/grasping, and lifting. 
BMMC instructed Ms. Mcintosh to wear her splint at all times. 
Ms. Mcintosh returned to work on a light duty status at Randstad, where she 
worked until April 10, 2015. Randstad did not accommodate her work restrictions after 
that date. Ms. Mcintosh has not worked since April 10, 2015 due to her hand and wrist 
condition. On April 24, 2015, Layana Willis at Randstad sent an email to Ms. Mcintosh 
telling her that she would need "an approval from a doctor to return back to work." On 
May 1, 2015, Layanna Willis at Randstad sent another email to Ms. Mcintosh notifying 
her that "the assignment with Accredo has been ended due to lack of work. Please don't 
return to work." 
On April 8, 2015, Glenn Parker, the insurance adjuster for ESIS, Randstad's 
workers' compensation insurance carrier, obtained a recorded statement from Ms. 
Mcintosh. She described her work injury claim and also noted, "Over the past year I've 
noticed that my hands get numb every now and then, but I'm able to usually massage ... 
my forearms and it comes right back and then I'm fine. It's never been a whole lot and 
it's never been lengthy and it's never been painful." During the Expedited Hearing, Ms. 
Mcintosh testified that any prior tingling in her wrists was minor and would go away, and 
that it was nothing like the pain she is now encountering. She also testified that she 
participates in no hobbies or non-work activities that contribute to the painful condition 
of her hands. 
On April 9, 2014, ESIS sent a letter to Ms. Mcintosh denying her claim because 
"there is no medical evidence that your present complaints are work related." Randstad 
submitted a Form C-41 Wage Statement for the fifty-two (52) week period prior to the 
alleged injury. According to Ms. Mcintosh, weeks 24, 41, 42, 51 and 52 of form C-41 
should not be included because she was sick during those weeks resulting in lower than 
normal pay. Eliminating those five (5) weeks results in total earnings of $25,072.06 for 
forty-seven (47) weeks, with an average weekly wage (A WW) of $533.45, and a weekly 
compensation rate (CR) of$355.63. 
Ms. Mcintosh's Contentions 
Ms. Mcintosh contends her carpal tunnel condition is a compensable, work-related 
injury. She is requesting that she be given a panel of orthopedic physicians for treatment. 
She has not worked since April 10, 2015, and remains unable to work because of her 
injury. She requests an award of temporary disability benefits. 
Randstad's Contentions 
Randstad contends the claim is not compensable because there 1s no medical 
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opinion that Ms. Mcintosh's injury arose "primarily out of and in the course and scope of 
employment" as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12). Randstad 
submits that it is not plausible that filing folders for a few days could have caused more 
than fifty percent (50%) of the alleged carpal tunnel condition. 
Randstad further contends that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-
6-305(a), an employee must give notice of an occupational disease within thirty days of 
its manifestation. Randstad submits that Ms. Mcintosh admitted in her recorded 
statement that she had occasional numbness in her hands over the past year, and she 
failed to give notice of this condition to her employer. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Standard Applied 
The Workers' Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally construed in 
favor of either party but shall be construed fairly, impartially and in accordance with 
basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the employee nor 
employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2014). An employee need not prove every 
element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain relief at 
an expedited hearing. McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 
2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. 
Mar. 27, 2015). At an expedited hearing, an employee has the burden to come forward 
with sufficient evidence from which the trial court can determine that the employee is 
likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. !d. 
Factual Findings 
Between March 23, 2015, and March 30, 2015, Ms. Mcintosh began experiencing 
pain and numbness in both hands while filing thousands of pages of documents at work. 
She gave notice of her condition to Randstad on March 30, 2015. She experienced some 
minor numbness in her hands during the previous year, but it immediately resolved and 
was much less severe than her current pain and numbness. Ms. Mcintosh participates in 
no hobbies or non-work activities that contribute to the painful condition of her hands. 
Randstad approved treatment at BMMC on one occasion before denying her claim. On 
April 1, 2015, BMMC made a preliminary diagnosis of acute carpal tunnel syndrome and 
referred Ms. Mcintosh to an orthopedic physician. Randstad refused to authorize a 
referral to an orthopedist. BMMC assigned light duty work restrictions that Randstad 
accommodated until April 10, 2015. Because of her injury and medical restrictions, Ms. 
Mcintosh has been unable to work since AprillO, 2015. 
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Application of Law to Facts 
Arising Primarily Out of and in the Course and Scope of Employment 
For injuries on or after July 1, 2014, an employee must show that her injury arose 
primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
102(13)(2014). "Arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment" 
requires a showing, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the injury causing 
disablement or the need for medical treatment contributed more than fifty percent (50%) 
considering all causes. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(B)(2014). "Shown to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty" means that, in the opinion of the treating 
physician, it is more likely than not considering all causes, as opposed to speculation or 
possibility. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)(D)(2014). At an expedited hearing, an 
employee has the burden to come forward with sufficient evidence from which the trial 
court can determine that the employee is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1)(2014); McCord, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, 
at *7-8, 9. 
In the present case, Randstad asserts that there is insufficient evidence that Ms. 
Mcintosh's alleged injury arose primarily out of or within the course and scope of her 
employment. Instead, Randstad asserts, "it seems implausible that filing folders for a 
couple of days could have caused more than 50% the alleged carpal tunnel." However, 
Randstad submitted no evidence to support this contention. To the contrary, Ms. 
Mcintosh testified that she had not previously experienced hand pain and numbness this 
severe, and that the pain and numbness began during a one-week period at work when 
she was required to re-file thousands of pages of documents. This is essentially the same 
history that she reported to BMMC. The records of BMMC report a diagnosis of "acute 
carpal tunnel syndrome both hands/wrists" and report no other causative factors than the 
work-related history supplied by Ms. Mcintosh. 
Tennessee law has long held that medical testimony is not to be "read and 
evaluated in a vacuum." Thomas v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 812 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tenn. 
1991 ). Instead, the medical proof "must be considered in conjunction with the lay 
testimony of the employee as to how the injury occurred and the employee's subsequent 
condition." !d. The Court finds nothing in either the current definition of injury or in the 
fact that the "medical testimony" is found in a stipulated document rather than a formal 
deposition to supplant this basic principle. Instead, this Court is constrained to evaluate 
all the evidence, both lay and expert, at this interlocutory stage of the proceedings to 
determine if Ms. Mcintosh is likely to succeed on the merits at a hearing. In so doing, the 
Court not only has considered the lack of evidence supporting Randstad's position that 
causation is "implausible," but also the medical records and the lay testimony of Ms. 
Mcintosh. 
The Court finds Ms. Mcintosh to be credible. She presented herself respectfully, 
competently, and without hesitation. Her description of injury during her live testimony 
matches her statements given to Randstad, as well as her history reported at BMMC, and 
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the record as a whole. In its totality, the evidence to date is sufficient for this Court to 
conclude that Ms. Mcintosh would likely prevail at a hearing on the merits regarding the 
issues of further medical care and temporary disability. 
Defense of Lack of Notice of Occupational Disease 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(13)(2014) provides that "injury" 
includes "occupational disease" arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of 
employment. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-305(a)(2014) provides that "within 
thirty (30) days after the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease, the 
employee, or someone in the employee's behalf, shall give written notice thereof to the 
employer in the same manner as is provided in the case of a compensable accidental 
injury." Randstad contends that Ms. Mcintosh's admission in her recorded statement that 
she had occasional numbness in her hands over the past year, and that she failed to give 
notice of this condition to her employer, is a valid defense to this claim. Tennessee law, 
however, has held that running of the time for giving of notice of occupational disease 
should be postponed until there is an actual disability and a reasonably sufficient 
opportunity to discover the disease and its relationship to the employment. Christopher v. 
Consolidation Coal Co., 222 Tenn. 727, 440 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1970). The Court finds 
that until the one (1) week work period beginning March 23, 2015, there was no "distinct 
manifestation" of an occupational disease and there was no duty to report the earlier 
minor numbness to Randstad. Therefore, Randstad's notice defense must fail. 
Medical benefits 
Having found Ms. Mcintosh has presented sufficient evidence to conclude she 
would likely prevail on the merits, the Court turns to the benefits requested. Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(1)(A)(2014) provides that the employer shall 
furnish, free of charge to the employee, such medical treatment as ordered by the 
attending physician and made reasonably necessary by the work injury. 
Randstad initially accepted the claim. It provided a panel of physicians and 
allowed Ms. Mcintosh to see a physician at BMMC on one occasion. The doctor 
diagnosed "acute carpal tunnel syndrome." A careful examination of the medical report 
reveals that, while it contained no specific causation statement, it did contain multiple 
notations that the condition began at work after filing thousands of files. There was no 
notation of any other causative factor in the medical report. BMMC referred Ms. 
Mcintosh to an orthopedic specialist. Randstad did not request a more definitive 
causation opinion from BMMC, but denied the claim on the basis "there is no medical 
evidence that your present complaints are work related." However, there is no evidence 
in the record of any other causative factor. The Court finds that Ms. Mcintosh has 
established a prima facie claim for carpal tunnel syndrome, and that she is entitled to a 
panel of orthopedic specialists as recommended by BMMC. 
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Temporary disability benefits 
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(2)(2014) provides for awards of 
temporary partial disability (TPD) during the time period during which the injured 
employee is able to resume some gainful employment in a disabled condition, but has not 
reached maximum recovery. The compensation rate for temporary partial disability is 66 
2/3% of the difference between the average weekly wage of the worker at the time of the 
injury and the wage that the worker is able to earn in her partially disabled condition. !d. 
The Court has already determined that Ms. Mcintosh is likely to prevail at a 
hearing on the merits as to a causal connection between her disability and her 
employment under the applicable standard at this Expedited Hearing stage. This Court 
finds Ms. Mcintosh also has demonstrated the likelihood of prevailing at a hearing on the 
merits as to an inability to work within her restrictions from BMMC. The restrictions, as 
of the single visit on April 1, 2015, remain in effect. Randstad accommodated these 
restrictions until April 10, 2015. Randstad owes TPD benefits following that date. Here, 
the average weekly wage is $533.45 and Ms. Mcintosh is not, due to her restrictions, able 
to earn a wage. Therefore, her TPD rate is two-thirds (2/3) of $533.45 or $355.63. She is 
entitled to TPD from April 11, 2015, until the date of this Order. She is also entitled to 
ongoing TPD until she is released without restrictions, is able to resume gainful 
employment at a job earning the same or better wage she received prior to her injury, or 
until placed at Maximum Medical Improvement. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
1. Randstad shall provide a panel of orthopedic surgeons compliant with Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(2014) for evaluation and/or treatment of 
the injury of March 23, 2015. 
2. Randstad shall, subject to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-
6-207(2)(2014), pay to Ms. Mcintosh TPD benefits at the weekly rate of $355.63 
for the period of AprillO, 2015, to the date of this order, a period of thirteen (13) 
weeks and two (2) days, or $4,724.80. Randstad shall continue TPD payments to 
Ms. Mcintosh until she is either placed at MMI or able to work at a job enabling 
her to earn a wage equal to or better than that earned at the time of injury. 
3. This matter is set for Initial Hearing on September 16, 2015, at 1:00PM Central 
Time. 
4. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, 
compliance with this Order must occur no later than seven (7) business days 
from the date of entry of this Order as required by Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3) (2014). The Insurer or Self-Insured 
Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the 
Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the 
seventh (7th) business day after entry of this Order. Failure to submit the 
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necessary confirmation within the period of compliance may result in a 
penalty assessment for non-compliance. 
5. For questions regarding compliance, please contact the Workers' Compensation 
Compliance Unit via email WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov or by calling (615) 
253-1471 or (615) 532-1309. 
Initial Hearing: 
An Initial Hearing has been set with Judge Jim Umsted, Court of Workers 
Compensation Claims. You must dial in at 866-943-0014 toll free to participate in 
your scheduled conference. 
Please Note: You must call in on the scheduled date/time to 
participate. Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues without 
your further participation. All conferences are set using Central Time (CT). 
Right to Appeal: 
Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited Hearing Order 
to appeal the decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. To file a Notice of 
Appeal, you must: 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: "Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal." 
2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven (7) business days of the 
date the Workers' Compensation Judge entered the Expedited Hearing Order. 
3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party. 
4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of 
$75.00. Within ten (10) calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, 
payment must be received by check, money order, or credit card 
payment. Payments can be made in person at any Bureau office or by United 
States mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the alternative, the 
appealing party may file an Affidavit of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the 
Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing fee. The Affidavit ofindigency may be filed 
contemporaneously with the Notice of Appeal or must be filed within ten (1 0) 
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calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board will consider the Affidavit of 
Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying the request for a waiver of the 
filing fee as soon thereafter as is practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee 
or file the Affidavit of Indigency in accordance with this section shall result in 
dismissal of the appeal. 
5. The parties, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal, 
may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording of the hearing for the 
purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court reporter and filing it 
with the Court Clerk within ten (1 0) calendar days of the filing of the Expedited 
Hearing Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, the parties may file a statement of the 
evidence within ten ( 1 0) calendar days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing 
Notice of Appeal. The Judge must approve the statement of the evidence before 
the Court Clerk may submit the record to the Clerk of the Appeals Board. 
6. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the interlocutory 
appeal, the appealing party shall file such position statement with the Court Clerk 
within three (3) business days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing Notice of 
Appeal, specifYing the issues presented for review and including any argument in 
support thereof. If the appellee elects to file a response in opposition to the 
interlocutory appeal, appellee shall do so within three (3) business days of the 
filing of the appellant's position statement. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a tru and correct copy of the xpedited Hearing Order was 
sent to the following rec~Jients by the following methods of service on this the 13th day 
of July, 2015. 
Name Certified First Via Fax Via Email Address 
Mail Class Fax Number Email 
Mail 
Sarah Mcintosh X justkaye44@aol.com 
Ormand Deallaume, Esq. X odeallaume@bakerdonelson.com 
L ~~-
Pe'nny Shr~j Clerk of Court 
Court of Vi1 o rkers' Compensation Claims 
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